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Abstract 
Violent conflicts have been a characteristic feature of Nigeria’s polity since the recommencement of democratic 
rule in May 1999. The various dimension of conflict witnessed ranges from ethno-religious, inter-communal, 
post-election violence, and so on.  Over 187 ethno-religious conflicts were reported between May 1999 and 
April 2009; and since 2009 boko haram activities have been on the increase and over 115 attacks reported in the 
north.   Nigeria is thus seen as a conflict prone society as no geopolitical zone is immune. Scholarly account 
points to youth as the prosecutors of over 90% of these violent conflicts and the youth constitute about 70% of 
Nigeria’s population. But are the youth victims of these violent conflicts or the perpetrators? A critical analysis 
of the situation using secondary data revealed that over 60% of youth lack access to employment and 
development opportunities. 90% of the 1,430,000 youths that graduated from tertiary institutions between 2004 
and 2014 roam the streets and become victims for manipulation by corrupt political elites and their associates to 
perpetrate and persecute violent conflicts on their behalf in order to strengthen or legitimize their political and 
economic positions. Critically, youth are more of the victims of Nigeria’s democratic process that deny them 
opportunities and being the perpetrators of violent conflicts is but a manifestation of this denial. Therefore, value 
reorientation for political elites and more job creation programs for youths in both private and public sector of 
Nigeria’s polity is strongly recommended.  
Key words: Conflict, Democracy, Electoral Process, Victims, Violence, Youth, 
Introduction  
Nigeria as a political entity is no stranger to violent conflict for it spent three years of the first decade of political 
independence on a horrible civil war.  The years under military dictatorships were not without incidences of 
violent conflicts and several occurred between 1984 and 1998: the 1984-1985 Maitatsine religious crises in parts 
of Kano, Maiduguri, Jimeta –Yola and Gombe; the 1986 Ilorin, Kwara Muslims and Christian clash; the March 
1987 Kafanchan, clash between Muslims and Christians at the College of Education and the 1988 February 
Kaduna religious riots, among students of Kaduna Polytechnic; the April, 1991 Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi quarrel 
between a Fulani and Sayawa meat seller but escalated into full blown violence and later took the color of 
religious war; the October, 1991 Kano peaceful procession by the Izala sect to halt Rev. Reinhard Bonnke’s 
crusade in Kano degenerated into a violent and bloody religious confrontation; the 1992 Zangon Kataf crisis;  the 
1993 political violence in Lagos  the aftermath of the annulment of the June 12 election; the December 1994 and 
May 1995 Kano communal violence trigged of by the beheading of a Christian who allegedly desecrated the 
Qur’an; the May, 1995 Abule –Taylor Lagos bloody clash between the police and members of the dreaded 
Maitatsine sect; the Ife-Modakeke crisis of 1998 and so on ( Hussaini, 2010;  Aliyu, 2005; Elaigwu, 2005 and 
Adisa, 1995 ). 
With the transition from military rule to democratic government in May, 1999, a constitutional government 
based on democratic principles such as: the rule of law, fundamental human rights that were absent under 
military regimes, there were expectations that unity, social cohesion and development could be facilitated among 
the various social groupings. This expectation is predicated on the view that in a democratic government 
individuals and social groups feel more secured than in non-democratic government (Mijah, 2009). Ironically, 
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the situation in Nigerian polity has not reflected this view of democracy. Shortly after the inauguration of the 
civilian administration, various ethnic groupings in the country started to ventilate their pent-up anger against the 
state for perceived injustice and marginalization. This resulted in the proliferation of ethnic militias championing 
ethnic agitation for a better deal in the political system. For instance the Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) 
represented Yoruba land, and in Igbo land the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB); in the North, Arewa Peoples’ Congress (APC) as well as The Plateau Youth, The Jukun Youth 
Movement, The Benue/Tiv Youth Movement, The Kano-based Atjdid Movement and the Boko Haram sect; and 
in  the South-South region, holding sway are Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM) Bakassi Boys, Supreme Egbesu 
Assembly(SEA), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND);  The Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni People (MOSOP), among others (Femi, 2013 and Joseph, 2006).   .  
Essentially, democratic rule brought in it heals an increase in the spate of violent conflicts that threatens human 
survival, development and unity. Such as ethno-religious, militancy, inter-communal, electoral and political 
violence, indigene and settler clashes, pastoral and farmers violent clash, boko haram activities, and so on.  
Literature on some of these shows that between May, 1999 and April, 2009 at least 187 ethno-religious conflicts 
occurred with devastating effect on lives and properties (Freedom, 2011; Mijah, 2008 and Elaigwu, 2005). The 
Unfortunate aspect of this development is that youths are seen as central to the perpetration of violent conflicts, 
and prosecutors of over 90% of conflicts (Kenneth, 2011).  But is Nigeria the only polity battling with the 
challenges of violent conflicts? No, rather it is a manifestation of what obtains in many conflict-ridden and 
multi-ethnic societies and particularly in Africa since the 1990s (Christopher, 2011).  However, what makes 
Nigeria’s case a source of concern is that every geo-political zone is characterized by entrenched structure of 
violent conflicts and youths are seen as the principal driving infrastructure and ironically, youth constitute about 
70% of Nigeria’s population. Literatures on youth involvement in violent conflict suggest that they are 
perpetrators due to economic and other social factors. But the critical argument based on economic, political and 
other social factors used in this analysis, is that youth are more of the victims of political and economic 
structures and of violent conflicts than perpetrators.  
Conceptual and Analytical Framework 
The most popularly used concept in social science as well as contemporary discourse on governmental system is 
democracy, and like other social science concepts defies a universally accepted definition. However, the word 
“democracy” from scholarly expressions comes from the Greek word demokratia and literally means “rule of the 
people” (Noah, 2006) or from the Greek demos, ‘people’ and kratos ‘rule’ (Oche, 2004). While Birch (1993) 
argued democratic government originated from the Greek city-states, where democratic ideals started and were 
transferred to other societies. Democracy in its modern form came into use during the course of the 19th century 
to describe a system of government in which representatives are chosen through free competitive elections and 
with most citizens of the society having the right to vote. This form were instituted in Britain and United States 
between 1860 and 1890 and later spread to other European countries as well as the developing regions of the 
world including Africa and Nigeria in the second half of the 20th century. The ideal form of American modern 
system of democracy is captured as: ‘the supreme, absolute and uncontrolled power remains in the people. Our 
constitutions are superior to our legislature so that people are superior to our constitution...democracy is then that 
government in which the people retain the supreme power’ (Padova, 1963:16 in Noah, 2006:192). As such, most 
scholars often elaborate on this ideal form. Oche (2004:10),  points out three basic senses in contemporary usage: 
a form of government in which the right to make political decision is exercised directly by the whole body of 
citizens, acting under procedures of majority rule, usually known as direct democracy; a form of government in 
which the citizens exercise the same right not in person but through representatives; and a form of government, 
usually a representative democracy, in which power of the majority are exercised within a framework of 
constitutional restraints designed to guarantee all citizens the enjoyment of certain individual or collective rights 
such as freedom of speech and religion, known as liberal or constitutional democracy.   
The second and third of the identified forms is what could be applied to Nigeria. For instance, Chapter 11 of the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with amendments in 2011 titled Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy stipulates how government organs are to operate from Section 13 to 24. 
And Section 13 states “It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of government, and of all authorities 
and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial power, to conform to, observe and apply the provisions 
of this chapter of the constitution”. Thus constitutional provision such as Nigeria’s, are base on the view as 
expressed by Oche (2004) is what has made democracy to become more widely praised as the best option for 
good governance, and all states today profess to be democracies (Dunn, 1979 in John and Paul, 2009).  
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But does contemporary representative democracy as practice in most social systems especially that of Africa and 
more specific in Nigeria’s polity really rule of the people based on constitutional provisions or rule by a few 
political elites who disregard the constitution and manipulate the polity for the interests of a few individuals? In 
other words, is the conduct of democracy in Nigeria based on the constitutional provisions of democracy and 
social justice?  A critical response to the issues raised is that democracy in Nigeria has not been conducted 
according to democratic principles. Elections and electoral process are indispensable ingredients of democracy 
as it provides citizens with opportunity to elect representatives have neither been fair nor free since 
independence (Dunmoye, 2011). Rather it has been marred with fraud and irregularities. For example, the rule of 
law is merely pronounced, elections and electoral processes are subverted and political parties and other 
important public institutions are manipulated in favor of the privileged few (Yagboyaju, 2011:93). Furthermore, 
Awowole-Brown (2011:5) notes the 2011 elections were heavily rigged in rural areas of Nigeria where the 
electoral observers have no access.  
 Going by the above observations this paper critically summit that, representative democracy in Nigeria cannot 
be defined as rule of the people since the process has been marred with fraud and irregularities. In other words, 
the process does not provide the electorates with adequate opportunity to elect representatives in a competitive 
free and fair election. It is on this basis that the elite theory which emphasis that democracy is rule by a few 
individuals becomes the relevant analytical framework.    
 The elite theory of democracy is credited to prominent classical theorists Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941); Vilfredo 
Pareto (1848-1923) and Robert Michels (1876-1936) (http:/eduresource centre.blogspot.com/p/vilfredo-classical-
elites-theory.html?). As a theory devoted to the study of state, elite theory seeks to describe and explain power 
relationship in society. The various arguments of these theorists emphasized an inescapable division between 
dominant minorities variously called elites, ruling classes, political classes, oligarchies, aristocracies and so on; 
and the dominated majority or masses. It means that, in every organized social system there exist two groups 
those who rule (minority) and the ruled (majority).  Mosca (1923/1939, 51, in John, 2014)   made emphasis on 
the ways in which small or a few minorities out-organize and outwit large majorities and that political classes are 
political elites who command certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority over those they govern. 
Pareto (in John 2014) posited, in  a society, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; 
but in actual societies elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, 
and these elites usually enjoy important advantages in form of inherited wealth and family connection in society. 
Elites (‘oligarchies’)  in society operate efficiently Michels argued as they gain control of funds, information 
flows, promotion, and other aspects of organizational functioning, and then power becomes concentrated in their 
hands and retaining this power increasingly governs their actions (Michels 1915/1962 in Linz, 2006).  
These arguments are indicative that representative democracy is just rule of the elites and as stressed by Femia 
(2001) the inevitability of elite rule makes democracy an imaginary dream and those elite can never be 
accountable to the people. In other words the most that is possible is an elite-manipulated democracy. In it there 
are elected parliaments and other elected offices, but voters do not really choose their representatives. Rather, 
professional politicians and other power seekers impose themselves on voters or have their friends impose them. 
In Nigeria the various literatures on election and electoral process shows that the electoral process were marred 
by fraud and irregularities (Awowole-Brown, 2011; Dunmoye, 2011; Yagboyaju, 2011; Garuba, 2007 and 
IDEA, 2001) are practical examples of this argument that elites manipulate the democratic process. Hence one 
cannot help but agree with Mosca and Michels that, democracies can never be more than competitions between 
elites who greatly narrow voters’ choices and grossly distort voters’ interests.  As such, democracy in Nigeria 
could be defined in line with John and Paul (2009) conceptualization as a system of elected and competitive 
elites, a model of elitist democracy with low participation, and often met with contestation from opposing 
political elites and their associate in form of violent conflict.    
Youth Conceptualized  
The meaning of youth and the way societies regard youth(s) vary tremendously across time and space.  In an 
attempt to conceptualize youth, several variables are often used by scholars, national governments, international 
organizations and other bodies interested in the study of youth as a group in society, their role and position in 
national development and so on.  This paper draws from scholarly definitions and thus focuses on youth as age 
group. 
In conceptualizing youth as an age group we consider as relevant view provided by international organization, 
and also link with national definition or categorization. The United Nations defined youth as an age group that is 
between 15 and 24 (Lyndsay and Erika 2009).  But this definition differ with the meaning of youth in Jordan, 
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because the lowest age range for youth is 12, and the upper range for youth in a number of African countries – 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda and even Nigeria is above 24.  Similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) used the term adolescent for those aged 10-19, and youth for those 
from 15-24 and young people 10-24.  An essential fact from the forgoing is that, there appears to be an overlap 
between the definitions of youth and children.  The Convention on the Rights of the Child, defined child as 
everyone under the age of 18, which means that youth and child falls within the same age group, and the 
dictionary on education referred to this age group 15-24 as young adults (Lyndsay and Erika, 2009).  In Nigeria, 
adulthood is attained as stipulated in the Constitution when an individual clocks 18 and obtains the right to vote 
and thus cease to be a child [Chapter 111 Section 29 subsection (4)-(a)].  Similarly, the provision of the National 
Policy on Education for basic and post-basic education indicate that persons between the ages of 15-30 are 
expected to be enrolled for educational development at the senior secondary and tertiary levels of the education 
sector, to prepare them for useful living. National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) Scheme, is meant for person’s 
not older than 30 years of age.  This age categorization is not ideal as even those yet to attain the age of 13 are 
often entangled in violent conflicts as such the conception of youth as an age group for the paper is age 12-30 
since the analysis is on Nigerian youth and violent conflicts. Bearing in mind the activities of community youth 
groups and their categorization as street children (specifically almagiri’s in northern Nigeria); security vigilante 
and youth gangs (Hussaini, 2010).   
Conflict 
Interestingly, conflict is an inevitable part of social existence for human interactions or relationships are often 
shaped or influenced by conflict.  Conflict connotes struggle between at least two parties, occasioned by 
incompatible desires. The incompatible desires may be social, economic, political, intellectual and even 
psychological in nature (Sills, 1968:237 in Tangban, 2005:305). For Akpenpuun (2010), it is a social problem in 
which two or more persons, families, districts, communities, states or nations are at war with each other, or it 
reflects a class of interest or goal between parties, which may be:  individual, or groups of individuals, or ethnic 
groups or even states.  Aja (2007) conceptualized conflict as an attitude, behavior or an action or a process that 
introduces strains and stresses in the relationship between two or more parties on, say the attainment of a set of 
interests or goals.  In other words in conflict, parties see or treat each other as a stumbling block and may result 
in frustrating the other from achieving or attaining a set of goals. These goals could be political power, economic 
position, social and so on. As such when physical force is used in order to achieve the set goals the conflict is 
classified as violent and from the relative deprivation argument, people are prone to violent conflict if they feel 
that they are not receiving what they deserve relative to other individuals or groups (Jacob, 2014).  The return to 
democracy in Nigeria in 1999 ushered in the politicization of ethnic, regional and religious identities by political 
elites in their competition for political power. Those seeing no prospects of politic power become aggrieved and 
often take the violent route and given the current economic hardship and high level of unemployment, “armed 
youths for hire” are available at cheap cost. Thus the armies of unemployed youth are always willing to find new 
jobs as body guards, assassins, and cannon-fodders in communal violence. While the federal government 
‘deregulates’ the economy, politicians ‘deregulate’ violence and control of instruments of violence, which are 
supposed to be the monopoly of government (Elaigwu, 2005:42-43).  
Democracy, Youth and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: An Overview  
Even though democracy is widely praised as the best option for good governance because of its principles- rule 
of law and citizens participation in decision making through elected representatives, and fosters unity in a polity, 
it is argued in line with the views of elite theorist that, in Nigeria this has not been the case. Rather it is rule by a 
few political elites who parade themselves as representative of the people and disregard democratic principles 
and constitutional provisions by manipulating elections and electoral process. Scholarly views show that 
elections and the electoral process have been marred by fraud and violence in diverse ways; and most Federal, 
Regional/State and local council elections have neither been free nor fair. And common electoral irregularities 
are: multiple and under -age registration, hoarding of voters cards, bribery to influence staff of electoral body, 
inflation of registration figures, falsification of results, intimidation, incitement, blatant hijacking of ballot boxes, 
as well as voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process and lack of equal conditions for contestants 
(Dunmoye, 2011; Adebayo and Omotola, 2007).  Höglund and Jarstad (2010) stressed that to those who are 
losing election, violence can be an attractive option to influence the electoral process and outcome. Furthermore, 
Alihodzic and Kaiser (2010) argued that elections, while representing an essential feature of representative 
democracy, are also intrinsically conflict inducing processes; they can render structural issues more visible and 
consequently hold great potential for triggering violence. As political elites contest for political power, ethnic 
and religious sentiments and loyalty get easily regimented for the achievement of goals.   
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 It is a known fact that conflicts had occurred periodically in Nigeria’s polity and the most notable being the civil 
war of 1967 to 1970. However, Nigeria’s conflict problems became exacerbated with the recommencement of 
democratic rule in May 1999. Nigerian polity since this development have been experiencing various dimension 
of violent conflicts and crimes ranging from intra-communal, inter-community, indigene/settler conflicts, 
farmers/herdsmen conflicts, ethno-religious, militancy, kidnapping, area boys/ gang groups, insurgences and so 
on.   Over 187 ethno-religious conflict occurred between May 1999 and April 2009 (Freedom, 2011; Mijah, 
2008 and Elaigwu, 2005).  While militancy and terrorist related acts have also intensified.  In South-East and 
South- South geopolitical zones having eleven states of the federation (namely: Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi 
and Imo; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo and Rivers) kidnapping is a crime bedeviling the area. 
According to Hyacinth and Chinedu (2013:292) kidnapping is crime that can largely be extended to the domain 
of terrorism because kidnapping is about the first strategy adopted by terrorist groups before the use of bombs 
became prominent and is directly linked to terrorism. Stressing that kidnapping activities in Nigeria can be traced 
to 12th January 2006, when members of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) captured 
Patrick Landry (USA), Nigel Waston-Clark (Britain), Harry Ebanks (Honduras), and Pat Crawley (Bulgaria) at a 
Shell Platform in Ekeremor Local Government Area of Bayelsa State. Christian and Ambily (2013) argued, these 
expatriate were held for 19 days and within 11 days of this incident, Meinbutu militant group in Delta State 
(South –South geopolitical zone) kidnapped 24 Filipinos for 24 days. Ironically, Chukwuma and Ubong (2013), 
and Ambily (2013: 597-8) notes that between 2006 and 2009, 21 militant organizations sprang up in the Niger 
Delta region and were coordinated by the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND). These 
militant youth groups have since formation in various parts of the region carried out strategic militancy that are 
premised on implementation of resource ownership, control and management that was already enshrined in the 
Constitution. Etekpe (2011) notes that from these and similar forms of violence in the Niger Delta, what comes 
close to terrorism were strategic militancy.  
 Reports on kidnapping cases in Nigeria indicate that between January 2006 and March 2010 about 48 took 
place, and with the South - East and South-South recording 19 and 25 incidences respectively (Hyacinth and 
Chinedu, 2013:294-298).  And by the end of 2006 more than 79 foreigners were taken as hostages (Freedom, 
2013).  According to Ambily (2013: 589) the federal government amnesty program in October 2009 was borne 
out of the “doctrine of necessity” as the militants continued to disrupt the flow of crude oil and gas, and 
kidnapped 100 foreign oil companies’ workers, and killed 20 of them between 2006 and 2009. In addition to 
these are pockets of violent clashes, and between May 1999 and March 2011 about 59 different forms occurred.  
53 of these occurred in the South-South geopolitical zone and the remaining 6 incidences in South-East 
geopolitical zone (see Elaigwu, 2005; Joseph, 2006; Yomi and Opuene, 2006; and Dunmoye, 2011). The 
violence clashes are in form of inter- communal, intra-communal, area boys/gangs and so on, and the persecutors 
or actors are mostly youths (in form of ethnic youth militia-Egbesu (Ijaw) Youth and Itsekiri militia, Movement 
for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Bakassi Boys, Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and so on 
(Christian and Ambily, 2013:364; and Dunmoye 2011:277). 
These acts of violence in the geopolitical zones left its mark such as: massive destruction of property, loss of 
lives and the razing down of several communities. Available literature on casualties, shows that about 3,361 lives 
were lost; over 20 towns sacked; over 6 buildings razed down; 200 brand new Peugeot 307 cars, and 500 brand 
new tricycles were burnt down; 20 Toyota Hiace Buses and 9 Hilux Jeeps were either completely destroyed or 
vandalized (see Christian and Ambily, 2013; Dunmoye, 2011; Ekong, 2011 and Elaigwu, 2005). In addition we 
submit here that so many people were displaced as a result of violent acts and specifically the surviving 
inhabitants of the over 20 communities noted to have been sacked are such displaced persons. In understanding 
the magnitude of displaced persons in these geopolitical zones, Kwanashie (2012:12) account of an operation to 
dislodge MEND militants based in the fishing villages of Oporoza and Okerenkoko on 13th May 2006 in which 
30,000 inhabitants of these villages were displaced provides us with more insight to the situation. 
A focus on South-West geopolitical zone - Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo, shows that this zone has 
had its share of violent conflict. Available scholarly track indicate that between May 1999 and December 2014, 
this zone recorded over 26 violent clashes that centres around inter or intra-communal rivalry; area boys 
activities and political thugs/ party supporters; OPC and religious groups and so on. Estimated number of death 
toll based on scholarly compilations and reports shows that over 600 lives were lost, many people were injured 
and property worth millions of naira were destroyed (see BBC News Africa December 2014; Dunmoye, 2011; 
Isaac, 2011; Joseph, 2006; Noah, 2006; Elaigwu, 2005).  
 In northern Nigeria’s three geopolitical zones:  North-Central (Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau 
and FCT); North- East (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states); and North- West (Jigawa, 
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Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara states) several dimensions of violence occurred. Centering 
on the activities of ethnic and religious militants, indigene/settler, farmers/herdsmen, Boko Haram terrorist acts 
and so on.  Over 288 cases of violent conflict and attacks reported in these zones.  North- Central recorded over 
67, North- East about 146 and North–West over 70 cases of violent conflicts between May 1999 and December 
2014.  The estimated numbers of lives lost from the three geopolitical zones indicate that about 5,640 lives were 
lost to violence and over 250 women abducted in North- Central zone; more than 5,793 killed and over 600 
women and young girls abducted in North-East; and over 9,457 killed in North-West. Thus bringing the total 
estimate of lives lost to 20,890.  While properties destroyed shows that, 34 houses, 5 offices and 14 churches, 
139 vehicles, 100 motorcycles and 200 cows for North-Central; and in North-East over 4000 houses,  211 
schools, 41 churches, a mosque, 200 shops, 4 gasoline stations, 111 vehicles and 500 Laptops. For the North-
West 128 churches, 53 mosques and 211 houses were equally affected (see BBC News Africa December 2014;  
Okoli and Iortyer, 2014; 2014, Humanitarian Needs Overview Nigeria; Jonathan, 2013; Isaac, 2011; Dunmoye, 
2011; Ekong, 2011; Joseph, 2006 and Elaigwu, 2005).   
 Looking at the general situations on violent conflicts recorded in Nigeria with the return of the country to 
democratic rule in May 1999 from the six geopolitical zones, this paper argues based on the compilations and 
observations provided in the above overview that more than 24,851 lives were lost; more than 20 towns sacked; 
4,245 houses affected; over 479 vehicles, 600 motorcycles/ tricycles, 200 shops, and 500 Laptops were 
destroyed; about 1 1 office buildings and 212 schools affected; while 183 churches and 55 mosques were either 
torched or destroyed. 
Democracy, Youth and Violent Conflict Victims or Perpetrators: A Critical Discourse      
 Nigeria’s democratic environment between May 1999 and December 2014 have been confronted with different 
dimensions of violent conflicts ranging from  intraparty clashes, political assassinations, post-election violence 
and communal unrest, militancy terrorist acts  and so on. Thus creating a polity marked with unchecked 
proliferation, hiring, and arming of militias in different forms to serve narrow political ends. The militias in 
Nigerian polity are made up of youths and according to Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart (2010) politicians and 
party bosses found a ready supply of unemployed men, frequently youths, willing to perpetrate violence in 
exchange for pay and fire power. They further argued that these young men comprised a significant percentage 
of lost. Scholarly focus on the Niger-Delta area points to the fact that the corruption of the Nigerian political 
process had not only left the oil mineral- producing communities of the region poor and underdeveloped but had 
un-intentionally created a large class of young men who have no hope of legitimate work that would fulfil their 
ambitions that are easily recruited into violence (Human Right Watch, 2003 cited in Emeka, 2013:228). 
 Similarly, in the north covering three geopolitical zones, scholars have stressed that ethnic, communal, political/ 
post-election related violence, religious and even the activities of the  Boko Haram terrorist sect were perpetrated 
by youths who form the army of unemployed and are often manipulated by political and other class of elites to 
persecuted violent conflict for their political and economic ambitions. For instance, Leena (2014) aver, the 
aftermath of Buhari’s third loss at the polls (2011) demonstrated by his supporters –mostly young northerners-
degenerated into deadly clashes with security forces in Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Bauchi states. The 
homes and businesses of several members of the northern elite who had openly supported Jonathan and PDP 
were attacked, for what the protesters perceived as the betrayal of the North’s interests and the failure of 
democracy to improve their lives.  The violent reaction to the results of the 2011 elections from these states of 
the north could be linked to the view expressed by Alihodzic and Kaiser (2010) that as political elites contest for 
political power, ethnic and religious sentiments and loyalty get easily regimented for the achievement of goals.  
In other words, the contests for control of state policy produce religious and ethnic interests and since the return 
to democracy these have been used in different forms to lay claims to and demand particular interests, and 
unemployed youths are often used as tools to express dissatisfactions. Leena (2014) further stressed, in 2010, 
nine of the 19 northern states had the highest levels of unemployment in Nigeria-some as high as 40 percent-with 
young northerners being overwhelmingly more likely to be jobless. It means that the democratic environment, 
characterized by electoral fraud that is corruption and high levels of youth unemployment is but a breeding 
ground and drivers of violent conflicts and increasing insecurity. 
 In a critical expression, Ezeani and Ezeibe (2011:247-8) argued that defense spending in Nigeria grew about 9 
percent annually on average from fiscal year 1999-2009 against education and health spending that grew about 
0.3 and 0.6 percent annually within the same period, and that despite this abrupt increase in defense spending 
annually, the level of insecurity in Nigeria worsened because the military personnel are reluctant in spending 
these funds and they rather see these funds as compensation for their staying out of politics and protecting the 
democratic government that lacks legitimacy. The fraud and irregularities in the elections and electoral process 
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that has been a characteristic feature of the democratization process as has been demonstrated through several 
scholarly arguments in Nigeria’s polity, brings into power illegitimate government and leadership (see David, et 
al 2014:92; and Inokoba and Kumokor, 2011). Ezeani and Ezeibe (2011) puts it thus “ political leadership has 
failed to prioritize national needs and respect the virtues that bond society, promote stability and harmony such 
as social justice, equity, rule of law and respect for individual/group rights and other democratic principles”. 
Consequently, political leadership as stressed trigger conflict drivers in the society like social division, 
militarization, elites’ fragmentation and competition and the emergence of ethnic and sectarian militias in order 
to increase and rationalize military spending and repressive apparatus to forcefully hold the people within 
bounds of order. 
 In relation to the above, Ahmed and Idowu (2013) noted, since 1999; Nigeria has continuously witnessed events 
that serve as sources of generating not only threat to security but particularly insurgencies. These they further 
stated includes electoral malpractices, dysfunctional democracy in political parties; manipulation of ethnic; 
sectional and other identity based primordial ties in power contestation; primitive greed and acute sleazebag at 
all tiers of governance; monetization of campaign and elections; corrupt judicial process and system; lack of 
synergy among various security outfits; open injustice in the political and security administration of the country 
and lack of pro-activeness in tackling ethno-religious cleavages.    
From the forgoing observed situations and conduct of democracy in the country, our critical view is that, the 
emergence of the 21 militant camps in the Niger-Delta area between 2006 and 2009; the Boko Haram sect 
terrorist activities in northern part of the country since 2009 to date; the activities OPC Militants; the spate of 
ethno-religious, inter and intra- communal clashes; pre-elections and post-elections violence and so on are the 
results of unconstitutional conduct in the democratic process in Nigeria’s polity.  Furthermore, the 
unemployment situation in the country has rendered the most vulnerable population that is the youth as viable 
tools manipulated by political elites and their associates to perpetrate violent conflict for their benefit.  For 
instance views on the conduct of the ruling elites and political office holders in our democratic government 
indicate that Rivers state government in 2003 had recruited armed militias to carryout widespread electoral 
fraud, and the leader of Niger-Delta Volunteer Force (One of the 21 militant camps) Asari Dokubo linked former 
governor of Rivers state, Peter Odili, Abiye Sekibo, former Federal Transport Minister and some of Odili’s aides 
as sponsors and financiers of armed groups and reaffirmed the militarized nature of Nigerian politics, where the 
political process is subjected to force of corruption (Emeka, 2013:228).  The political fallout between governor 
Peter Odili and Mujahid Dokubo- Asari (leader of NDPVF) has been attributed to the latter’s public criticism 
that the April 2003, local and state election process as fraudulent, and with the former (governor Odili) 
withdrawing financial support from the NDPVF, and subsequently began to support financially the Niger Delta 
Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom, both groups are primarily made up of Ijaws 
(http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/conflict-in-the-Niger-Delta; Accessed, 04/01/2015 9:31). 
Focusing on the north and the activities of the Boko Haram sect,  scholarly view throw lights on how the Boko 
Haram Sect draw their membership, and office holders linked to the sect.  Accordingly, literature reveals that, 
the sect draws membership mainly from dissatisfied youths, unemployed graduates and former almagiri’s mostly 
but not limited to northern Nigeria; and sustains its operations through diverse sources of fund such as: donation 
from politicians, government officials and individuals, or organizations within Nigeria.  And specifically on 5 
January 2011, the Nigerian police made some arrest and Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a contractor and, one of those 
arrested was alleged to be a major financer of the sect.  Furthermore, on 21 November 2011, state security 
operatives also arrested and subsequently arraigned a serving Senator representing Borno South Senatorial 
District Mohammed Ali Ndume before an Abuja High Court, for ties with, and sponsorship of Boko Haram 
(Freedom, 2013:411-412: ). Other sources has it that a Boko Haram spokesman claimed the former Kano state 
governor Ibrahim Shekarau, and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly ( see the Nigerian 
Tribune, 21 May 2012 ). Former Borno state governor (Ali Modu Sherif) is another politician linked to Boko 
Haram and according to Ali (2014: 3) a known senior member of Boko Haram, late Boju Foi was actually 
appointed as commissioner by the former governor, and as such marked the official and unofficial connection 
between the group and influential politicians and government functionaries that facilitate the flow of patronage.   
In addition, Desert Herald report ( for 25 November to December 1 2014: 6-7)  also named the former governor  
as the political founder of Boko Haram, stressing further an airport closed for months over security concerns, 
was opened just for use of the former governor. The same report points out that it was the US that first alerted 
the world that 10 generals of the Nigerian Army were among 15 officers being secretly investigated for passing 
sensitive information to Boko Haram as well as availed the government with suspected list of Boko Haram 
sponsors, and intelligent report pointing to high level friends of government in the executive, legislative, senior 
party officials, elder statesmen and security officers including retired ones.  President Goodluck Jonathan 
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admission on the 8th of January 2012 that Boko Haram sponsors have infiltrated his government further confirms 
these views.  
 In South-West zone, the militant youth wing of the O’Odua People’s Congress (OPC) (led by Ganiyu Adams), 
method of attacks centered on intimidations and killing between 2000 and 2003. The former governor of Lagos 
state Bola Tinubu announced on 25 June 2001 plans to turn this militant OPC youth wing into state security 
service in a ceremony at the commissioning of the statue of late Mrs Kudirat Abiola. And to give credit to this 
announcement the governor released and discharged unconditionally, about 100 OPC members arrested by the 
Nigerian police in connection with criminal activities ranging from arson, assassination to armed robbery (see 
Christian and Ambily, 2013: 365). 
The forgoing literatures linking politicians/ office holders as sponsors, or supporters of various militant groups 
known for terrorizing Nigerian polity since the inception of the fourth republic is a clear indication that these 
groups are manipulated for political ambitions and economic positions. Hence having a large pool and army of 
unemployed youths becomes an imperative strategy, and is more beneficial to political elites and their associates 
than adhering to the constitutional provisions and obligations to the electorate. So also, the political elites often 
manipulate unemployed youths using religious, ethnic and other cleavages that best serve their political 
ambitions. Thus creating a democratic environment in which leaders in the words of Achebe (1983) cited in 
Oladayo (2014: 152) use the instrument of power to commit and maintain corruption.  Oladayo further draws our 
attention to the argument of Atelhe and Agada (2014) that political corruption happens in a democratic setting, 
and rears its head when politicians and political decision makers who are the custodian of the law for the benefit 
of all are corrupt.  
As a critical discourse on democracy, youth and violent conflicts in Nigeria: victims or perpetrators? This paper 
draws reader’s attention to the provision of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with amendments 
2011. It is stipulated in Section 140 (1) A person elected to the office of the president shall not begin to perform 
the functions of the office until he has declared his assets and liabilities as prescribed in the constitution and he 
has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and the oath of office prescribed in the Seventh Schedule of the 
Constitution. This stipulation is also applicable to other elected offices. The irony is that   public officials have 
over the years refused to declare their assets as stipulated, and this marks the beginning of corruption/illegality in 
the conduct of democracy, governance and accountability to the electorate by political elites.   In addition, 
Chapter 11 of the 1999 Constitution, Section 13-18 dwells on democratic principles and how the state should 
operate for the people and on issues pertaining to fundamental obligations of government.  For example, it state 
in Section 14.-(1) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State base on the principles of democracy and 
social justice; and in (2) - (a) sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this 
constitution drives all its powers and authority; (b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary 
purpose of government; and furthermore in 14 (5) The state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of 
power.   
A critical look at these provisions base on the conduct of political elites and public office holders under the 
fourth republic governments shows that: (a) the principles of democracy has not been adhered to as the electoral 
process have been marred by electoral fraud and irregularities. The consequence of this development is that those 
losing elections often resort to violent protests to declared elections results (see David, et al 2014:95). In this 
regard, we argue that sovereignty does not belong to the people, rather to political elites who manipulate 
elections results and even use violence in the electoral process; (b) the democratic environment since the 
inception of the Fourth Republic (May 1999 to December 2014) has been characterized by spate of violent 
conflicts ranging from ethnic, religious, communal, militancy and terrorist related violence and so on. Within 
this period, and as demonstrated in literatures above, over 373 cases of violence acts were reported and about 
24,870 lives lost. It means that the primary purpose of government which is the provision of security and welfare 
of the people was handled poorly. Furthermore, government has equally failed to abolish all corrupt practices 
and abuse of power. Many political office holders are reported to have committed acts of corruption and 
specifically electoral fraud and failure to declare assets (constitutional provision).  Similarly, the abuse of power 
has been documented at all levels of governance, from the executive, legislature as well as the judicial arms and 
so on. The observation made by the United States Government, on Friday, April 29, 2013 cited in Temple 
(2014:2) indicted the President Goodluck Jonathan led Federal Government of massive and widespread 
corruption, and examples cited to buttress this opinion include among others the conviction of former Delta State 
Governor James Ibori in the Southwark Crown Court in London of charges of money laundering and other 
financial crimes totaling N12.4bn, after he was acquitted by a Nigerian court; and the N1.067trn fuel subsidy 
fund lost to endemic corruption.  In addition is number of cases being handled by the Economic and Financial 
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Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) that have remained 
inconclusive, including the case of alleged misappropriation of N1bn against former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Dimeji Bankole, and N40bn against his deputy Usman Nafada. So are other cases against four 
former governors- Gbenga Daniel, Adebayo Alao-Akala, Aliyu Akwe Doma, and Muhammed Danjuma Goje for 
allegedly misappropriating N58bn, N25bn, N18bn, and N12.8bn respectively.  Others are Diepreye 
Alamieyesigha, Uzor Kalu, Rashid Ladoja, Jolly Nyame, Lucky Igbinedion, Boni Haruna (currently serving 
ministers), Attahiru Bafarawa, Samimu Turaki and Adamu Abdullahi.  
Oladayo (2014) provided insight into corrupt practices linked to the presidency as the highest political office in 
Nigeria, and that: (a) during the reign of Obasango from 1999-2007, the presidency was involved in a corruption 
scandal in which the vice president (Atiku Abubakar) was indicted by Senate committee set by the chamber to 
investigate his role in the activities of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF). (b) The President 
(Obasanjo) used his influence to acquire shares at Transcorp, and also persuaded the economic elite to build a 
presidential library for him in Abeokuta. In addition, the 16 billion dollars that was budgeted for power 
generation in the 8-year reign of the president cannot be accounted for since there is still erratic power supply in 
Nigeria. (c) The incumbent president (Goodluck Jonathan) was embroiled in a controversy when an Italian 
construction firm built a Church as a gift to the president in his home community of Otuoke in Bayelsa State. 
Furthermore, the president has also been accused of conspiracy silence in corruption allegation leveled against 
the Minister of Petroleum, and have been berated for granting presidential pardons for convicted political 
criminals. Others accused of corruption are Sunday Afolabi, Fabian Osuji, Hussaini Zannuwa Akwanga, Alice 
Osomo and Stella Odua (all federal ministers). The National Assembly being the watchdog of the executive arm 
of government has also had its share of corruption scandal. Those involved include Chimaroke Nnamani, Iyabo 
Obasanjo, Patricia Etteh, Farouk Lawal, Boniface Emanalo and Herman Hembe.      
 Generally, financial corruption as observed above since the inception of the fourth republic in Nigeria affects 
the capacity of government to provide basic necessities which the constitution took cognizance of. Under Section 
17.- (3) the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that-  (a) all citizens without discrimination on any 
group whatsoever, have opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity 
to secure suitable employment; and (f) children; young persons and the aged are protected against any  
exploitation whatsoever, and against moral and material neglect.  Our argument is that democratic governance in 
Nigeria has not met the yearnings and aspirations of the people. Rather issues of the political elites are given 
priority attention over and above the electorates. Children and young persons are not protected against 
exploitation and are also denied access to adequate means of livelihood and employment opportunities. It’s noted 
that public and private sectors of Nigerian economy are not adequately equipped to deal with unemployment, 
more so with youth unemployment problems, and with about 60% of youth lacking jobs ( Danjibo, 2009). The 
employment rate for 2011, Benjamin (2013) notes stood at 23.9 % with youth unemployment rate at over 50%.   
 In 2005, the Education Sector Analysis (ESA) for 2004 reported that, out of the 130, 0000 youths that graduate 
from Nigerian universities annually only about 10% are able to secure paid employment. Leaving 90% of 
graduates, in addition to other school leavers, both skilled and unskilled wondering the urban and semi-urban 
streets in search of employment opportunities that is not available.  The immigration recruitment exercise of 15 
March 2014, in which 700,000 applicants applied for only about 3000 available vacancies and placements, 
demonstrate clearly the situation of youth and unemployment problem. And if we multiply 130,000 graduates 
with 11 years of democracy, a total of 1,430,000 graduates join the labor market and only 14,300 gained 
employment, leaving 1,415,700 unemployed. 
Evidently, youth unemployment is a deadly menace that has been ignored and neglected by political elites that 
comprises group of people in government institutions- Presidency, National Assembly and the Federal Executive 
Council that control government machinery. In addition are those at the state, local government and community 
levels. While youth that constitute about 70% of Nigeria’s population, and with about 60% unemployed, and 
roam the streets for paid employment opportunity, the political elites who control the reign of government are 
busy enriching themselves and consuming large amount of the country’s wealth as salaries at the expense of the 
electorates. In 2010, former Central Bank of Nigeria governor (Sanusi Lamido now Emir) lamented that the 
National Assembly Members that are less than1percent of the population consumed 25 per cent of the nation’s 
budget ( Oladayo, 2014).  
 It’s evident from the forgoing that achieving a level of financial independence for many youths has become a 
myth in Nigeria.  Unemployment has risen to above 40% Mijah (2008), Yomi and Opuene (2006) observed that 
about 60 % of Nigerian youths reside in urban areas and about 40 % of them are unemployed and this situation 
poses threat to urban security, development, national security and democratic consolidation. Youths in 
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desperation could be vulnerable to manipulation and according to Freedom (2011), become victims and also 
perpetrators of violent conflicts. Youths generally constitute a vulnerable social group and in need of special 
protection.  They become victims and at the same time perpetrators of violent conflict because they are easily 
influenced, and obviously war would not be possible without youths. The combatants of any conflict or war in 
any part of the world are made up primarily by young people (Christopher, 2011; Kathleen, 2006 and Haryey, 
2003).  Youths are energetic, and easy to mobilize in societies where unemployment is high, and where social 
justice is absent and corruption thrives as is the case in Nigeria. Hence the reflection that masses (youth 
inclusive) are easily cornered, brainwashed and their right of choices manipulated to a point that some of them 
are susceptible to bribery and can be used as political thugs to cause confusion, harassment or intimidate on 
opponents during elections. As such, we emphasize that youth are more of victims of our democratic process that 
has failed to provide them with secure and adequate employment opportunities and also protect them against any 
exploitation, and against moral and material neglect. Therefore, we concur to the view by Ogwuche (2013: 272) 
that “the causes of militancy and violence in Nigeria are: corruption by public officers and leaders; selfish 
interest, youth unemployment; ethnic differences; manipulation by elites; social injustice; unfair distribution of 
resources; and socio-economic marginalization”. 
Conclusion 
The paper attempted a critical analysis of democracy, youth and violent conflict in Nigeria’s fourth republic. 
Though democracy is widely praised as the best system of government, its conduct in Nigeria has not been based 
on strict adherence to democratic principles and constitutional provisions. Rather elections and electoral process 
are essential ingredients for representative democracy, the Nigerian experience has been marred by fraud and 
violent conflicts in diverse ways and youth are seen as perpetrators and prosecutors. Ironically, youth constitute 
about 70% of Nigeria’s 170 million people, and 60% are unemployed. Out of the 130,000 youth that graduated 
from universities annually, only 10% end up gaining employment. Thus from 2004 to 2014 an estimated 
1,430,000 youths joined the labor market. Generally, being unemployed and constituting the bulk of Nigeria’s 
population, youth are at the mercy of the same elites who have progressively closed the doors to employment 
opportunities. As such political elites exploit children and young persons (youths) a social group that the 
constitution stipulated should be protected against exploitation whatsoever, and against moral and material 
neglect. Morally, youths in contemporary Nigeria are socialized into a democratic environment characterized by 
electoral fraud and violence as electoral contest are turned into war among the various fractions of the power 
elite; ethnic and religious intolerances; indigene/ settler identity crisis; corrupt practices and so on.  In other 
words children and youth, who are our future leaders and hope, are misled and misguided by corrupt people and 
corrupt practices. And materially, youths are denied opportunities to develop their potentials to the fullest to 
improve their wellbeing.  As expressed by Sam Omatseye a criminologist, “while we contemplate criminalizing 
the Boko Haram group, we must understand that we created them. The elite had food but did not give them. 
They had school but did not educate them…had shelter but left them loiter in the heat and sand. So they followed 
Yusuf who gave them a living, no matter how little” (Oyofo, 2011 cited in Christian and Ambily, 2013: 366). 
Furthermore,  literatures shows that militant youth groups emerged in the southern part of the country in 
response to neglect, and kidnapping which has been established as an act of terrorism is only but a weapon of the 
weak to draw attention to particular area of neglect in the polity. Thus we conclude that youth in Nigeria’s 
democratic environment are often manipulated by political elites to perpetrate violent conflict for their benefits 
and in this regard they are more of the victims of violent conflicts than perpetrators. The ruling elites are never at 
the scene where violence clashes are being played out, elites do not get killed during violent attacks (except 
those caught up in transit or assassinated) but youths end up losing their lives in violent clashes.    
Recommendations  
 The recommendation is that political elites in Nigeria needs value reorientation and more job creation program 
for youths in both private and public sector of Nigeria’s polity and finally democratic principles and 
constitutional provisions be adhered to in its totality. 
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